Bank managers insulated from shareholder influence took less risks. Is this evidence that shareowners should back off? That we need more focus on long-term share ownership? Or what? Please weigh in.

If the bank manager's compensation is aligned with LT shareholder's interests via restricted stock, etc. a fair balance of risk taking with OPM would result.

Maybe that the key, long-term shareholders. "Chris Cernich, executive director for proxy contest research at Institutional Shareholder Services, has found that companies with an activist investor on the board typically outperform their peer groups by 16.6 percentage points." businessweek.com

I think that "activist investor" is too general. Ichan is an "activist investor" who focuses on financial gain. His portfolio (at least what we know publicly) has outperformed.

There are also "activist investors" who focus on other objectives (environmental, social, etc.).

I wonder what the research says about the relative performance of these different types of activist investors.

Good point. Further breakdown on type of activist would be helpful. What would such a typology look like?

I would probably just group by objective. An activist may be in one or more groups.

Broadly:

1. Financial (subgroup may be by type of financial objective such as long term growth, short term growth, long term value, short term value, etc.)
2. Social (I would include environmental under this)
3. Employee (unions tend to focus on this)